










ESTATE TAXATION WITH BOTH ACCIDENTAL 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1799 
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
SEPTEMBER 2006 
 
PRESENTED AT CESIFO VENICE SUMMER INSTITUTE, WORKSHOP ON 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




ESTATE TAXATION WITH BOTH ACCIDENTAL 





Actual inheritances are an hybrid of canonical types of bequests and in particular of accidental 
bequests and altruistic bequests. In this paper, bequeathed estate consists of two components: 
an amount intended by altruistic parents and an amount which results from the "premature" 
death of parents. Altruistic parents can also invest in their children’s education. Taxing those 
two types of bequests separately is known to have different implications. The purpose of this 
paper is to see the distributive incidence of estate taxation when those two components are 
indistinguishable. The substitutability between education and intended bequests plays a key 
role in the tax design. 
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Nobody likes paying taxes especially when he is dead. More today than
yesterday it would seem. An increasing number of countries are without an
inheritance or an estate tax and some, including the United States, contem-
plate to phase it out in the near future. This is a bit surprising for a tax
long thought are the most eﬃc i e n ta n dt h em o s te q u i t a b l e .F o ran u m b e ro f
social philosophers and classical economists estate or inheritance tax is the
ideal tax: it is highly progressive and it has few disincentives eﬀects since it is
only payable at death and it is fair since it concerns unearned resources. Yet,
opponents of the "death tax" as they have dubbed it claim that it is unfair
and immoral. It penalizes the frugal and loving parents who pass wealth on
to their children, reducing incentive to save and to invest.
Why so much controversy? One of the reasons is that there are diﬀerent
types of bequests, more precisely diﬀerent reasons to leave bequests and
for each of them the social desirability of a tax may vary. For example,
the advocates of estate taxation have often in mind accidental bequests the
taxation of which is supposed to be harmless. Opponents of the death tax
focus on altruistic bequests and the disincentive eﬀects of taxing them. They
also claim that it prevents small business from passing from generation to
generation.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the desirability of estate taxation
when bequests result from lifetime uncertainty and from a mere joy of giving.1
In the absence of private annuity market uncertainty about the length of life
leads to some unexpected bequests. At the same time, parents may very well
draw joy from giving some wealth (human and physical) to their children.
These two types of bequests — accidental bequests and bequests based on the
j o yo fg i v i n g—a r ek n o w nt oh a v ed i ﬀerent implications and particularly to
react to taxation in contrasting ways.2 If they could be distinguished they
should be taxed diﬀerently. Unfortunately they cannot be distinguished and
this makes the problem of estate taxation quite diﬃcult. Not surprisingly
its incidence is highly sensitive to the relative importance of the two bequest
motives.
To study this issue we use a two-period overlapping generations (OLG)
growth model cast in a closed economy. There is some idiosyncratic un-
certainty on the length of life in the second-period and there is no annuity
markets. This leads to accidental bequests and to a certain heterogeneity
among individuals. If there was no joy of giving and individuals had the
1This paper is an outgrowth of an earlier paper by Michel and Pestieau (2002). Philippe
Michel suddenly passed away during the Summer 2004.
2For an overview see Cremer and Pestieau (2005), Kaplow (2001).
2same labor productivity, the standard result is that a 100% tax on accidental
bequests has no adverse eﬀects on eﬃciency but can contribute to more eq-
uity. There is another source of bequests. Parents leave part of their saving
to their children out of some joy of giving. This type of bequests can take two
forms: education spending and ﬁnancial bequest. As shown by Becker and
T o m e s( 1 9 7 9 )i n v e s t m e n ti ne d u c a t i o nh a st h ep r i o r i t ya sl o n ga si t sm a r g i n a l
return exceeds the rate of interest. Education spending is not directly taxed
unlike intended ﬁnancial bequest. This taxation is likely to have some eﬀect
on the level of capital accumulation (positive or negative depending on the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution). In this paper we are concerned by
the eﬀect of estate taxation on the coeﬃcient of variation of lifetime income
and on average income. In other words we are not concerned by the optimal
taxation issue but rather by the marginal eﬀect of estate taxation on what
is considered as a reasonable index of inequality. The reason of this choice
(coeﬃcient of variation rather than social welfare function and tax reform
rather than optimal taxation) is one of analytical simplicity. Even within
this single speciﬁcation the problem happens to be diﬃcult.
Another source of heterogeneity is productivity. Individuals have diﬀerent
productivities which can be or not correlated across generations, but which
are statistically independent of lifetime uncertainty. We will see that the
desirability of an estate tax increase depends on the relative importance of
accidental and intended bequest, the balance between educational investment
and intended ﬁnancial bequest and the extent of intergenerational mobility.
Michel and Pestieau (2002) consider a much simpler version of this model.
In their paper the only source of heterogeneity is lifetime uncertainty. Individ-
uals have the same productivity. Preferences and technology are homothetic
and strictly concave. There is no transmission of human capital. If estate
taxes could be distinguished according to the bequest motive, the tax on
accidental bequest would always be desirable (i.e. it would lower the coeﬃ-
cient of variation without depressing average output).3 The tax on intended
bequests is only desirable when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
is less than or equal to 1. When it is higher than 1, the reduction in capital
accumulation can more than outweigh the reduction in inequality. When the
two taxes are merged, there is a value of the elasticity of substitution higher
than 1 above which the tax is undesirable.
3The conventional wisdom that accidental bequests if they could be taxed separably
should be subject to a 100% tax has be recently challenged by Blumkin and Sadka (2004)
who show that in an optimal income tax setting à la Mirrlees leaving some accidental
bequests untaxed can be desirable as it relaxes the self-selection constraints. In our model,
there is no optimal taxation and intended bequests come from the joy of giving and not
from pure altruism.
3In this paper we introduce productive heterogeneity and intergenerational
mobility. We also look at the impact of alternative taxes on the coeﬃcient of
variation and on the mean of income. There is a price to pay for this gener-
alization: we can only use log-linear utilities and Cobb-Douglas production
functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the basic OLG
model is introduced with the steady-state values of capital accumulation,
aggregate production and human capital. In section 3 we turn to the cal-
culation of the coeﬃcient of variation of life-time income and analyze the
eﬀects of alternative tax tools on the steady-state value of this coeﬃcient.
Section 4 combines the tax incidence on both average income and inequality
to evaluate the welfare incidence of tax policies and particularly of estate
taxes. A ﬁnal section concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
2.1 Consumers
To deal with the problem at hand we adopt a standard OLG model with life-
time uncertainty. Individuals belonging to generation t and of productivity i
live for two periods. They work and earn wthi
t in the ﬁrst with wt being the
standard wage rate and hi
t an index of human capital. They also inherit bi
t
at the beginning of this period. They then devote their resources, wthi
t + bi
t,
to present consumption ci
t, educational investment ei
t+1, and saving si
t; ei
t+1
serves to enhance the productivity of the next generation’s worker. Saving
is then devoted to consumption di
t+1 in their retirement period and to some
intentional bequest xi
t+1. We assume zero population growth which implies
that each parent has only one child.
Uncertainty in the length of lifetime is captured by assuming that each
individual lives with certainty the entire ﬁrst period but that they either live
for the entire second period with probability (1 − π) or die prematurely at
the beginning of the second period with probability π. Probably π is the
same for all generations; its value is common knowledge.
Individual type is deﬁned by an ability parameter ai
t which combined
with some education investment ei
t supplied by altruistic parents generates

























¢1−µ 0 <µ6 1.
4The distribution of ai
t is time invariant with unitary mean ¯ a =1and variance
σ2
a. If there is perfect correlation between parent’s and child’s ability, both
have the same type; otherwise, a child of type i does not necessarily inherit
from a parent with the same productivity. We will denote this intergenera-
tional correlation by  .
Individuals preferences are represented by a log-linear utility function
with three arguments: ci
t,d i
t+1,Ii
t+1,n a m e l y ,ﬁrst period consumption, second
period consumption and total intended transfers to children. We write:
U
i
t =l o gc
i
t +( 1− π) ˜ β logd
i
t+1 + γ logI
i
t+1 (1)
where ˜ β and γ are parameters reﬂecting time preference and altruism respec-
tively. For simplicity reasons, we use the notation β = ˜ β (1 − π), the product
of time preference and survival probability.
In this setting ﬁnancial bequests consist of an unintended part, the second
period consumption of a parent who prematurely died and an intended part,
xt+1. There are two ways of bequeathing voluntarily: by investing in educa-
tion, et+1 or by leaving xt+1. Note that the argument of the utility function
is xt+1 , that is after tax bequest as we show below. An individual of type
i and belonging to generation t receives from his parent ei
t which implies an
eﬀective wage hi
twt; he also receives bi
t = xi
t if his parent lives through the
second period or bi
t = xi
t + di
t if his parent dies. From now on, we will use
a second superscript j =1 ,2 for this. Individuals are thus characterized by
their ability i, their generation t and whether or not they beneﬁtf r o ma c -





t+1 taking into account the eﬀects of these two transfers on the expected














where θ denotes the (subjective) weight given to human capital relative to
physical capital. As a benchmark, θ =1 , but we allow for the possibility
that education receives more or less weight than physical bequest. In our
formulation, individuals derive some joy of giving from intentional transfers,
but not from the accidental one, if any. This is the consequence of our
speciﬁcation of paternalistic altruism.

























t is the lifetime income, s
ji
t , saving. The subscript j =1 ,2 denotes
whether or not there is unexpected bequest. Rt+1 is one plus the rate of
interest. Both R and w are to be determined by the productive side of the
model.
Although formally modelled as a two-periods model, we have in fact three
overlapping generations. In period t we have the working generation t,t h e
surviving retired generation t−1 and the generation t+1 of children who have
a passive role and receive an amount et+1 of education from their parents.


















Figure 1 depicts the intergenerational ﬂows xt, et and dt (with probability
π). Education et+1 is transferred to t+1generation at period t and bequest
xt+1 is given at period t +1 .
2.2 Taxes and transfers
Let us now introduce alternative taxes. First we have a wage tax, τw,a n d
ac a p i t a lt a x ,τr. T h e nw eh a v ea ne s t a t et a xt h a ti sd e n o t e dτb,b u tf o r
the sake of presentation we also distinguish a tax on intended bequest τx
a n dat a xo nu n i n t e n d e db e q u e s t ,τu. The government also makes a uniform
lump-sum transfer T to the young generation. There is no public debt: tax
revenue ﬁnances this uniform transfer. We posit time-invariant tax rates; only
Tt d e p e n d so nt i m et os a t i s f yt h er e v e n u ec o n s t r a i n t .





it + wt (1 − τw)h
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t+1 (1 + τx)
Rt+1 (1 − τr)
. (3)





t+1 + θwt+1 (1 − τw)h
ji
t+1 (2’)
We can now turn to the choice of an individual belonging to generation
t,o ft y p ei and having or not received an accidental bequest. It amounts to









Assuming interior solutions for these 4 variables, we obtain the following









































































These two parameters z and q can easily be interpreted. They repre-
sent the tax wedge that distorts the choice of intended bequests relative to
consumption and the choice of education relative to intended bequest. The






.A n o t h e r w a y
to express this it is to say that the eﬀective tax on intended bequests is
1 − z =
τx + τr
1+τx
. In choosing between education and intended bequests (as-
sumed to be positive), the parent equates their respective rate of return: Rz
and w(1 − τw)
∂h
∂e












With the log-linear utilities and Cobb-Douglas education function, c, d
and e are necessarily positive. As to x, it could be negative; this is why one
7generally assumes non negative bequests. Here to keep the problem simple,
we even assume that x is positive. Later we provide the necessary condition
for this to hold.
2.3 Production







where Yt is aggregate output, Kt, the capital stock and ¯ ht,a g g r e g a t eh u -
man capital. Population N is constant and normalized to 1. Consequently,
aggregate output and per capita output are equal.
We assume total depreciation after 1 period. Proﬁt maximization implies
Rt = αY t/Kt and wt =( 1− α)Yt/¯ ht
where wt is the wage rate per eﬃciency unit. For further use, we write:
kt = Kt/¯ ht.
Capital accumulation with total depreciation is equal to aggregate saving:
Kt+1 =¯ st.
Both saving and human capital can be obtained from individual choices.
We can show that saving is motivated by two objectives: second period























Summing up over all individuals ji one obtains:
































In the same way, we aggregate education and then the resulting human























It is important to understand the dynamics of this model. At the start of
period t, an individual of productivity i inherit either b1i
t or b2i
t depending on
whether or not his parent belonging to generation t − 1 and being of type i
dies prematurely. In other words it is important to distinguish (i,t − 1) from
(i,t).
2.4 Bequests and life-time income
It is now time to introduce the two types of bequests. In case of early death


















































=1when the two types of bequests are undistinguished
(τx = τu = τb).
As already mentioned we assume that xi
t+1 > 0. For further use, we now
write the average levels of bequests:
¯ b
1









− zθq wt+1¯ ht+1
¯ b
2
t+1 = ¯ b
1









Using (7) average inherited wealth can be rewritten:
¯ b
1













t+1 = ¯ b
1


















β (1 − ϕ)
β + γ










(1 − τw)(1− α)Yt+1θ. (11.2)
As we assume that ¯ b2
t+1 =¯ xt+1 > 0,w eh a v e :
αγ
1 − α
>β q θ .
Depending on the death of his parent, a child of ability i will have an
income ω1i
t or ω2i























+( 1− θ)zqw th
i
t + Tt (12.1)
ω
2i













+( 1− θ)zqw th
i
t + Tt. (12.2)
In aggregate terms, we write
¯ ωt = π ¯ ω
1
t +( 1− π)¯ ω
2









+( 1− τw)wt¯ ht + Tt. (13)
Using equations (11.1) and (11.2) for ¯ b
j
t and the revenue constraint:









+ τwwt¯ ht + τrRtKt, (14)
we have:
¯ ωt =( 1+τx)¯ b
2







+ wt¯ ht + τrRtKt, (15)
which can also be written as:





(1 − π)(1− τr)(α +( 1− α)qθ )
¸
. (16)
It is interesting to observe that average lifetime income and average out-
put don’t coincide with or without taxation. Without tax and with θ =1
one has:






10Another way of presenting this diﬀerence is to write:
¯ ωt = Yt − (1 − π) ¯ dt. <Y t
where ¯ dt is the average consumption of the old at period t.I t s h o u l d b e
noted that in the present model, life-time income is income accruing to the
young generation.
2.5 Capital accumulation
With full depreciation, saving is equal to the capital stock used in the next
period.






























[β + γ − β (1 − π)(1− τr)(α +( 1− α)qθ)] (17)
2.6 Steady state
We now turn to the steady-state solutions to which the economy converges.










































We then obtain output in the steady-state:
Y = Ak










11For further use, let us diﬀerentiate log
µ

























β (1 − π)(1− τr)θ
















Assuming that logY is strictly concave, we have that Y is a single-peaked
function of q with maximum at q∗.W et h u sh a v e :





The intuition is straightforward. For q<q ∗, enhancing the human capital
relative to the physical one is desirable; it is growth promoting to raise q,
namely lowering τw relative to τx and τr. The opposite occurs once we reach
q>q ∗. The reason why capital tax τr is raising Y is that in the present
model we suppose that the collected tax revenue is transferred to the young
who save.
3C o e ﬃcient of variation
We now turn to the coeﬃcient of variation of the life-time income which is
going to be our measure of inequality.
From (12.1), (12.2) and (10.1), (10.2),w ew r i t e :
¯ ω
1
t+1 − ¯ ω
2







(αz +( 1− τw)(1− α)θ)Yt+1.





























































t+1 − ¯ ω
1
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In this expression we used the following results:





































where   is the correlation between ai
t and ai
t+1,a n dσ2
a is the variance of ai
t,
which is time invariant.







1 − θ + θµ
γ + πβϕ
1+β + γ
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(αz +( 1− τw)(1− α)θ)
2 +
2 
1+β+γ (1 − α)



























After some manipulations one obtains an expression for the coeﬃcient of





























































that represents the net of tax price of planned bequests. It normally includes
both τx and τr that represents the double taxation of planned bequests.
Then, there is q that denotes the relative net-of-tax price of earnings relative
to planned bequests. Finally, ϕ represents the trade-oﬀ between planned
and accidental bequests including the tax rates. When these rates cannot be
distinguished, ϕ =1 .
To assess the eﬀect of these tax parameters on welfare and not just on
inequality, we need to know their impact on per capita i n c o m e .W eh a v es e e n





14For tractability reasons we didn’nt use a social welfare function. We can
however talk of an unambiguous increase in welfare if we have an increase in
Y combined with a decrease in CV. Consequently we can look at the eﬀect
of our price parameters on CV, Y and social welfare.
Table 1: Welfare eﬀect of price parameters
Eﬀect of an increase of qτ r ϕz
on CV (+) (−)( + )( + )
on Y (+/−)( + )( 0 ) ( 0 )











T a b l e1g i v e st h ed i r e c te ﬀect of price parameters. For example, we observe
that the direct eﬀect of an interest income tax increase is welfare improving,
but it has indirect eﬀects on z and q that can change this conclusion. What
is clear is that a relative increase in the tax on unplanned bequests (ϕ going
down) is welfare improving.
4 The incidence of taxes on welfare
Unambiguity with respect to q, τr, ϕ and z does not mean unambiguity
towards the tax rates themselves. Starting with the coeﬃcient of variation,






















































The eﬀect of a tax on unintended bequests is not surprising. That of a wage
tax is due to the absence of labor supply distortion. As to the two other taxes,
15their ambiguous incidence can be explained by the fact that they intervene
at diﬀerent levels. Finally, we consider the case where ϕ =1 . In other words,
















The eﬀect of such a tax is still ambiguous.
As to the eﬀects of taxation on average income, we have seen (see 2.6)
that they depend on whether q ≶ q∗.
Note that if we assume away human capital formation, all these taxes
would have no eﬀect on the capital stock, and thus on Y (see Michel and
Pestieau (2004)). Introducing human capital formation, it is clear that a
tax on earnings discourage education and a tax on both capital income and
unintended bequest induce a substitution in favor of education. Table 2
summarizes this ﬁnding.
Table 2: Welfare eﬀect of alternative taxes
Eﬀect of an increase of τw τr τu τx τb
on CV (−)?( −)? ?
on Yq < q ∗ (−) (+) 0 (+) (+)
q>q ∗ (+) (+) 0 (−)( −)
on SW q<q ∗ ?? ( + ) ??
q>q ∗ (+) ? (+) ? ?
I nt h ec a s eo fq>q ∗,r a i s i n gτw enhances social welfare lowering CV
and raising Y .T h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect of τu on welfare is not surprising. All the
others are ambiguous. However from Table 1 we know that welfare can always
be improved by using a combination of instruments. For example, assume
q<q ∗. Then raising q is growth-enhancing. This, however raises CV. So we
need to lower z to achieve dCV < 0.I n c r e a s i n gq and decreasing z is possible
by raising τx and adjusting τw =1−zq so that dτw = −qdz−zdq given τr.
To further our interpretation of tax incidence we now consider some sim-
ple cases.
We ﬁrst observe the following:
16• π =0or 1 means that there is no uncertainty on longevity and thus
no accidental bequest.
• θ =0means that transferring human capital does not generate any joy
of giving. This assumption is equivalent to µ =1(education has no
eﬀect on human capital).
•   =0means that there is no intergenerational correlation of ability.
• σ2
a =0means that everyone has the same capacity towards the human
capital technology.
Case 1: θ =0and µ =1 .
In that case k and y don’t depend on q but only on τr. We assume that














2 +( 1− π)γ
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a (1 − α)





1+β+γ (1 − τw)
2
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Henceforth, those three taxes have a positive eﬀect on equality. The
positive role of τw depends on σ2
a > 0 (and of  ). The positive eﬀect of
either τr and τb is independent of σ2
a and  .W h e nσ2
a =0 , the second and
third terms of the RHS of (23) vanish. This is the case studied by Michel and
Pestieau (2004).
Case 2: π =0 , =0
There are no accidental bequests and the source of inequality is σ2
a.W e
obtain the following value for the coeﬃcient of variation.
CV (ω)=
σ2
a (1 − α)




















17If we assume that
∂ (zR)
∂z






> 0.I ff u r t h e r m o r eq>q ∗,w eh a v et h ep a r a d o x i c a lc a s eo fat a xo n
bequests that increases income inequality and decreases average income.
5C o n c l u s i o n
To sum up, we have studied the incidence of alternative taxes on the steady-
state coeﬃcient of variation of lifetime income and on average production in
an overlapping generations model with two types of bequests, accidental and
planned, and two types of planned transfers, physical and human capital.
In spite of our very simple setting (Cobb-Douglas production function
and logarithmic utilities), we only get unambiguous results for the wage tax
and for an estate tax restricted to accidental bequests. A tax on interest
income and a tax on planned bequests have an ambiguous incidence on the
coeﬃcient of variation. Ambiguity results from the tax-induced substitution
between education and intended bequest.
Finally our model rests on two key assumptions. The ﬁrst is the welfare
criterion used, namely the minimization of the coeﬃcient of variation. Even
though in a static framework there is a close relation between maximizing a
utilitarian social welfare function and minimizing the coeﬃcient of variation;
this is not clear in a dynamic framework. We also look for the conditions
under which average income is increasing and inequality is decreasing. This
approach is surely more acceptable, but it is also highly demanding.
The second assumption is that of logarithmic preferences implying iden-
tical substitution between c and d on the one hand and between d and x on
the other hand. Empirically it seems that the substituability between c and
d is much lower than that between d (or c)a n dx. We plan in future work to
adopt a truly normative approach and to use a more general utility function.
Going back to the observed trend towards relying less and less on inheri-
tance taxation, our paper shows that one most often can ﬁnd a combination
of inheritance taxes and other taxes that decreases inequality and even in-
creases welfare.
4To obtain this result, we need
µ(β + γ)
1+β + γ
(α + β (1 − π)(1− τr)(1− α)θq)
2 <β(1 − π)(1− τr)(α +( 1− α)qθ)
2 .
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